Towards a Positive Theory of Supply Management

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Al Mussell

The Issue

Considering its narrow reach, the public dialogue on supply management- a public policy supporting a particular form of agricultural marketing used in milk, poultry, and eggs in Canada- seems outsized. Yet it is a common topic of critical journalism in broad public media, otherwise unconnected with agriculture and the nuances of agricultural marketing. It is also a slanted discussion- critics decry losses of efficiency, higher food prices, entitled farmers, awkwardness in Canadian foreign policy and trade.

But we did not just fall into supply management. Supply management presented a bold intervention to address a range of market distortions and failures, initially controversial among those most directly impacted, and challenging to carry out. As with any regulation, its impact should be understood and evaluated in the context of market failures and distortions it was developed as a mechanism to address, and on relative rather than absolute merits.

With the expectation of coming discussions on renewal of CUSMA/USMCA with the US and Mexico, and with barriers to dairy imports connected to milk supply management surely to become an increasing topic of discussion, it warrants a pause to consider economic concepts underpinning supply management, where these came from, the logic of their operation, and both the successes and challenges that have resulted.

The Setting

Supply management systems have existed in Canadian agricultural marketing for well over 50 years in Canada. To understand the motivations, one must return to the context that existed at that time, and also to differentiate somewhat between the commodities and the various issues of technology, markets, policy, and social factors. The data annex to the paper provides some pertinent data characterizing the period.

Dairy

As a cattle-based industry, adjustment in the dairy industry occurs over a very long time horizon. To understand milk supply management we need to go back to the turbulent post-Second World War period. From just prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Canadian dairy cow herd and broader dairy industry expanded. During the war this was facilitated by Canadian export contracts established with Britain to support the war effort, especially for cheese. This put Canadian dairy on an export footing that had not existed previously. For a period of time after the war, much of the European infrastructure for dairy production was under post-war reconstruction, and Britain retained its commonwealth trade preferences for dairy products with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. But Britain abruptly terminated the post war contracts in 1950-51. The result was a decreased demand for cheese and other dairy exports from Canada; ultimately, the commonwealth trade preferences for Canada and others were ended, leaving Canadian dairy in a surplus capacity situation.

At the same time, the 1950’s and 1960’s were a period of rapid development and adoption of improvement in dairy technologies. At the farm level, artificial insemination, automated milking, and profound improvements in animal nutrition increased farm output. The continuous butter churn and other industrial dairy processing improvements came into use, and butter and cheese making shifted from significant home production and small local factories toward larger and more concentrated industrial manufacturing dairy plants. Fluid milk bottling increased markedly. The overall effect was to exacerbate excess capacity by increasing milk produced and sold off farms, leading to chronic surpluses and low prices.

The issues were further exacerbated by structural issues. In the 1950's, Canada had a very large number of small farms, and many farms (perhaps most) had milk cows. For many mixed farms, milk was not a focus of their operations, but with cows already on the farm for home use with the excess sold, there was little incentive for them to reduce milk production, regardless of low milk prices. In turn, low and unstable prices made it more difficult for specialized dairy farms with efficient size and technology economies to get traction.

The surplus farm capacity also created distortionary conditions in milk marketing. With larger and more concentrated processors and many small producers for whom dairy farming was not a concentrated focus, the conditions existed for processor market power that contributed to low farm milk prices and limited farmers access to the market. Markets for fluid milk in cities offered higher prices for farmers in the periphery of urban centers prepared to make the investments to ship fluid grade milk. Others in more remote areas lacked practical access to fluid markets and were left with lower prices for milk used to make manufactured dairy products, creating potentially sharp inequities among the milk producer base.

The Canadian policy responses to these conditions in the 1950's and 60's were deficiency payments to dairy producers, support prices for butter, skim milk, and cheese to process surplus milk, and arrangements for export of surplus products and protections against dairy imports. However, by the late 1960's these policy measures for Canadian dairy had proven both very expensive and largely ineffective.

Poultry and Eggs

Canadian poultry and eggs were impacted by some of the same factors as milk, but differentially. Egg production capacity in Canada expanded rapidly during the Second World War to supply Britain. This continued after the war, but similar to dairy, with little notice Britain canceled its Canadian egg supply contracts, resulting in a protracted surplus in Canada and depressed farm prices.

Chicken and turkey did not experience the same problems of excess capacity and lost exports after the war. Rather, production of each of chicken, turkey, and eggs were especially subject to rapid improvements in farm technology- especially genetics, nutrition, housing, and animal health products- which presented the conditions for supply to grow faster than demand. With newly evolving technology and short production cycles, broiler chicken production in particular could be augmented quite quickly and threaten to swamp demand. At the same time, chicken and turkey imports also grew rapidly, while exports were inconsistent and typically minor, and ongoing large supplies chronically depressed producer prices. Imbalance between the number of producers and increasing concentration of larger, industrial processors led to concerns with processor market power in farm product pricing.

The prospect of supply growth in poultry and eggs exceeding demand producing low and unstable prices was also present in the US. There, the market imbalance was increasingly being addressed through vertical integration of the farm segment with feed, grading, and processing companies that managed supply-demand balances internally, rather than through markets. This came with the worry that this organization, if adopted in Canada, could drive out independent producers and transparent markets.

Legacy Issues

The developments of the 1950's and 1960's left Canada in situation of multiple critical agricultural marketing problems to address in milk, eggs, and poultry.

1. Chronic excess supplies and muted adjustment in the farm supply to low prices, which ultimately impaired the development of more modern industries with efficiencies in farm scale and modern technology.

2. Producer inequities resulting from differential access to market segments- most evident in fluid vs.

industrial milk, but also evident in table vs. breaker eggs used in food manufacturing. Sharp inequities presented the prospect of competition among producers for markets segments, eroding the value of differentiated segments.

3. Processor market power, and vertical integration of farms by upstream and downstream segments as means of aligning farm supplies with consumer demand, especially in chicken, turkey, and eggs.

Economic Fundamentals

In order for the three issues above to be addressed with supply management, the following necessary conditions must exist.

a. The product must be relatively price inelastic in demand, perhaps because the product has few substitutes, a strong brand and brand loyalty, or a general insensitivity of quantity purchased to its price
b. There must be a mechanism to discipline the supply, including imports
c. Because the supply is restricted, an auxiliary price mechanism is required
d. A mechanism capable of allocating/dissipating economic rents is required
e. An ability to price discriminate by end-use and share returns is required

Condition (a) is illustrated in Figure 1 below in the market for a farm product. The supply is from farms, with the demand from processors, ultimately derived from consumer demand. In order to be effective, any quota must be established to the left of the supply-demand equilibrium. In the left-hand panel A, a quota set at Q^{SM} , which is lower than equilibrium quantity Q^{E} , is consistent with a price increase from P^{E} to P^{SM}, which is a material increase due to the steepness of the demand curve. Conversely, in panel B, a similar decrease in volume from Q^{E} to Q^{SM} is incapable of support for almost any increase in price, because of the flatness to the demand curve. In panel A, with an inelastic demand, there is a range in which a higher price can be supported through supply restriction, as total revenue increases with price and volume adjustments. There is no corresponding range in panel B, where price and volume adjustments increase total revenue due to its elastic demand. The market in panel A is amenable to supply management; the market in panel B is not.

Implicit in the discussion above is that a mechanism exists to restrict the supply to the left of Q^{E}, consistent with (b) above. This occurs through a quota that binds all producers, requiring public policy authority for market regulation. However, the quota volume Q^{SM} cannot be independently identified or treated distinctly from the price level, P^{SM}, and since the price level is not established by market equilibrium, an alternative price target is required, also requiring policy authority for market regulation (c). In the context of Figure 1, panel A, the price P^{SM} must be identified, and then the quota Q^{SM} established to implement P^{SM}.

Figure 1 offers no obvious basis to establish P^{SM} . Because it cannot be based on a market clearing equilibrium, some other logic is required. Since these are farm product markets and intermediate goods, one approach would be to establish P^{SM} based on a formula from the associated downstream wholesale product markets, as occurs in US milk pricing under Federal Milk Marketing Orders. However, in Canada and provincially, the threshold size and liquidity for viable wholesale dairy, poultry, and egg product markets typically does not exist. Instead, pricing has occurred based on estimated cost of production (COP) from some combination of a producer survey and/or economic model updated for input prices and productivity performance. The use of COP as a price mechanism ties in with, and is indeed fundamental, to (1) above.

Figure 1 identifies the intersection of the supply with Q^{SM} with the marginal cost price (MCP). At the quota volume, the price exceeds the marginal cost, leading to an economic rent, which is measured in aggregate as (P^{SM}-MCP)Q^{SM}; the average unit value is just (P^{SM}-MCP). Because Q^{SM} is comprised of the output of many producers, as per condition (d), a mechanism is required to reallocate quota from exiting producers to new and expanding producers, and distribute the economic rent from the quota.

The tools of welfare economics have been the primary approach used to analyze and assess supply managed systems[1]. Figure 2 provides a simplified welfare economic analysis. The left panel in the figure represents an unregulated market in the farm product; the right panel represents a farm market regulated under a supply management program, as per Figure 1. In the left panel, consumers' surplus (CS) is illustrated as the area below the demand curve and above the price line- a triangular area that measures the residual benefit accruing to buyers (processors) at the equilibrium price P^E and quantity exchanged Q^E. Its counterpart is producers' surplus (PS in the figure), measured as the triangular area above the supply curve and below the equilibrium price. It is the residual benefit accruing to producers at the equilibrium price.

Compared with the left panel, in the right panel the price P^{SM} is higher, and the corresponding quantity sold Q^{SM} is lower. This results in a transfer of surplus from consumers to producers. The consumers' surplus is reduced to CS'; the producers' surplus increases to PS', consisting of the area below P^{SM} and to the left of Q^{SM} above the supply curve. This producers' surplus includes the economic rent from the quota (P^{SM}-MCP)Q^{SM}. This transfer is accompanied by an inefficiency from too little volume sold at too high of price. This is indicated in the deadweight loss indicated in the small triangle labeled DWL.

However, the deadweight loss in Figure 2 hinges on a reference benchmark in which concentrated processors do not exert power over the farm product market. Figure 2(a) adjusts for this, to help reflect the situation in (3) above. Compared with the left panel in Figure 2, processors that can exert purchasing power over producers are able to exploit producer marginal costs, and purchase a lower volume Q^M where marginal cost intersects demand. In so doing, the price can be pushed down to P^M where Q^M intersects the supply curve. The purchaser market power results in an inefficiency- too little farm product purchased at too low a price- giving rise to a deadweight loss labeled DWL. When this is compared with DWL in the right panel of Figure 2(a) illustrating a supply management program, the deadweight loss values appear similar.

The point is that, in the welfare economic analysis of a supply management program, if a free market reference is used that incorporates market power of farm product buyers, the deadweight loss may not be due to supply management at all- it also exists in the reference. Its primary welfare effect is to reallocate surplus from buyers to sellers, with marginal effects on the deadweight loss; the deadweight loss could even decrease with supply management.

In order to be feasible, a supply management program for a farm product must accommodate and control for imports of processed products. Under WTO rules, restrictions on import volumes occur using a tariff-rate quota (TRQ), with a minimal or zero tariff within the quota volume, and a much higher tariff on imports exceeding the quota volume. In a supply management program, imports of processed products must be accounted for in establishing domestic farm production/marketing quota, given the domestic price P^{SM}. This is illustrated in Figure 3, with the imports of processed products expressed in terms of farm product equivalents. Given the domestic price P^{SM}, the domestic demand Q^T is determined. In establishing the domestic production quota Q^{SM}, the commitment to imports under TRQ must first be accounted for. The imports have a border price of P^W, assumed equal to P^E in the figure. With $P^W < P^{SM}$, under the assumption of price arbitrage, the TRQ volume will be filled. With a border price lower than the domestic price, an importer can realize a margin of P^{SM}-P^W from imports, generating an economic rent from importing, labeled IR in the figure. The import rent

[1] There is a deep academic literature employing this approach. See for example, Veeman, 1982

IR is a function of the domestic price, the world price, and the TRQ volume.

Imports constrain a supply managed program. For example, an increase in the TRQ volume requires a corresponding adjustment to the domestic quota Q^{SM} if the domestic price P^{SM} is to be maintained; or conversely, if Q^{SM} is to be maintained, then P^{SM} must be reduced. Volatility and/or uncertainty in the TRQ volume increases the difficulty in managing the supply management program.

Facilitating universal access to market segments, without eroding the distinct value of the segments themselves, is essential to managing equity among producers as per (2) above. This is accomplished through price discrimination (through classified prices according to end use) and revenue pooling, as per (e). Classified pricing and pooling occurs within the broader supply managed structure illustrated in Figure 1, panel A.

Price discrimination between a farm product used in a premium-valued fresh market with an inelastic demand (like fluid milk or table eggs) and also used in a more price-elastic manufacturing market (like cheese or breaker eggs) is illustrated in Figure 4. In the figure, there is a minimum price in the fresh market P(fresh), which is supplied first at volume Q(fresh). The establishment of P(fresh) is administrative, as per the discussion of P^{SM} in Figure 1. After the fresh market has been fully served at P(fresh), supplies are directed to the demand in processing with the revenue from fresh and processing sales pooled, generating a demand based on blended revenue and a blend price received by producers. At the point where the supply meets the processing demand, Q' and P(processing), the demand based on revenue blended between fresh and processing markets and the associated blend price remains higher. In the left panel, this leads to a surplus of supply that extends beyond processing demand, resulting in volume Q(total). The effect is an inefficiency due to too much volume at too high of a price, as Q(total) exceeds total fresh and processing demands. The volume Q(total)-Q' must thus be marketed outside of the system. In the right panel, a quota is used to prevent this surplus. The quota is set to equate processing demand with supply so there is no excess supply, yielding a higher blended price versus the left panel, and also generating a type of quota rent given by (P(blend)-P(processing))Quota. The quota can also be set to the left of Q', in effect establishing minimum prices in both fresh and processing markets, and increasing both the blend price and the quota rent and with no excess supply.

Policy Fundamentals

The above section sets out the design essentials of economic policy to address the three key economic problems facing supply management. Implementation is more complex, and requires collective action and the support and authority of governments. In Canada, this encompasses provincial and federal governments due to joint authorities in agriculture, and agencies representing producers.

Fundamentally, provincial authorities are required for agencies to represent and bind producers. This extends to regulation of supply, pricing, and the establishment of product standards. In turn, this maps into requirements for multiple processes- a process to identify and license producers, a process to establish costs of production; a process to monitor and validate end-uses for price discrimination purposes and pool returns; processes to establish and enforce product standards; standards and processes for the valuation and individual transfer of quotas and their treatment as capital assets. Specifically in the context of Figure 4 and regulated price discrimination, arrangements are necessary to place producer interests in position of sole seller.

Federal authorities are required to manage interprovincial and foreign trade. Supply managed systems require extensive involvement in international trade policy, and compliance with Canada's international trade obligations. By design, supply managed systems increase producer prices in Canada, attracting processed product imports. This requires import controls and monitoring of imports to prevent the undermining of domestic marketing through TRQs on imports and protective over-quota tariffs, and processes to allocate import permits. It also includes the monitoring and reporting of implicit domestic support provided to supply managed products. Exports can also occur from supply managed industries, the result of specific or temporary surpluses within a supply-constrained system. But supply managed industries are domestic-focused and not export-based industries, and federal authorities are deployed in the monitoring and permitting of supply managed product exports.

Institutions of Supply Management

The economic and policy fundamentals above have given rise to a range of purpose-driven institutions in Canada. These include the following:

- Provincial commodity marketing boards, popularly elected by producers, with broad powers to bind producers and set standards in the respective supply managed products. The extent of these powers varies by product, with generally the farthest reach in dairy and eggs, which extend to price discrimination according to end-use and associated downstream audit functions.
- Federal agencies that align the activities of provincial marketing boards. These exist under the Farm Products Agencies Act that provide for national alignment of provincial marketing activities in poultry and eggs, and the Farm Products Council of Canada- federal oversight body. Separately, under the Canadian Dairy Commission Act, the Canadian Dairy Commission provides a provincial/regional coordination function in milk supply management. Some national agencies, such as Egg Farmers of Canada and the Canadian Dairy Commission, have international trade roles through trading and pricing activities.
- Federal-Provincial-Territorial committees with a specific coordination role, involving government and the industry. One example is the Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee, which is engaged in the monitoring and adjustment of milk quotas and associated issues. Others meet periodically to review/renew Federal-Provincial/Territorial Agreements on provincial allocations of poultry quotas.
- Federal agencies involved in regulating international trade in supply managed products. These include Global Affairs Canada, which monitors and issues permits for imports and exports of supply managed products under the Export Import Permits Act, supported by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

Observations

Supply management was developed in Canada to address specific economic problems, some of which were in common across commodities, and others more unique. Its unifying purpose- the prevention of persistent market surpluses- has faced challenges to adjust to numerous changes in markets, technology, and policy. For example, the evolution toward further processing in chicken and away from whole chicken/cuts more tangibly split the Canadian market between white and dark chicken meat, with differential market growth trajectories- but still subject to the same yield of white/dark meat given the physiology of broiler chickens. Cheese manufacturing was revolutionized in the late 1990's/early 2000's by technologies that increased cheese yields using recycled whey and skim products obtained from ultra-filtration technology, such as milk protein concentrate. Increasing production costs in eggs confronts a levy between table egg and breaker egg pricing that is essentially fixed.

This has required ongoing development in supply managed systems to address the changing environment, and also to meet the increased needs of its stakeholders. The intent was that production and processing of milk, eggs, and poultry could be profitable in Canada, and the success in doing so creates pressure for growth from within the system. Accommodating this, and doing so within Canada's international trade obligations, has generally driven increasing levels of complexity into supply managed systems.

General reflection on the three critical economic problems addressed by supply management suggests that it has met with major success. Canada is not confronted with ongoing malaise in the farm community from low and unstable prices due to chronic surpluses of milk, eggs, chicken and turkey, and economics have supported farm operations at efficient scale, and avoided mass scale. There are not classes of producers fragmented according to their access to markets- some the have's and others the have nots- and this outcome has retained distinct product market segments and valuation intact, with a proliferation of price/end-use classes, without generating volume surpluses that must be disposed of outside the system. Supply managed industries are not characterized by vertical integration, and where vertical integration has occurred between farm and adjacent supply chain links in Canada, it has generally been initiated by entrepreneurial farmers, and not suppliers or customers of farmers seeking to impose their terms on the farm level through integration.

These important successes, perhaps misunderstood or ignored by critics, justify a focus on operating supply managed systems at the highest levels of integrity, and better engaging market dynamism that is feasible with this regulated system. Clearly supply management must work for the farm segment, and as investments are made in research and development by the farm segment in combination with governments, this should translate into productivity improvements and price increases mitigated or indeed reduced farm prices- as indicated in the cost of production, adjusted for inflation- over time. In this regard, Veeman (1997) recommended that "Routine periodic mandatory efficiency and performance audits of boards could aid their accountability."

The welfare economics analysis in Figure 2, often applied in critiques of supply management, has, as its lynchpin, pricing based on cost of production, in which the higher the domestic price, the larger the transfer of welfare away from consumers (farm product buyers) to producers, and the larger the deadweight loss. But the welfare economic assessment of supply management depends crucially on the nature of the market reference that it is applied against, and whether that reflects actual market structure. As shown in Figure 2(a), there may indeed be no deadweight loss due to supply management, or it is certainly smaller, if the efficiency loss was already there due to processor procurement practices. The welfare economics assessment is also inherently incomplete, because it assigns no benefit to the alleviation of economic problems through supply management.

However, it remains that the cost of a supply management program identified from welfare economics analyses is directly proportional to the level of the producer price, based on cost of production; this finding should not be lost. Moreover, with increases in producer prices based on cost of production, increases in the corresponding economic rent are capitalized and manifest in rising quota values- presenting barriers for new entrants and potential difficulties in farm succession.

Supply management must also work for processors. For example, in procurement, a range of processes are used for allocation of farm products to processing in supply managed systems, and regulated allocation is a predominant instrument. Supply management will perform better for all the more aligned with ultimate end-use product demand that the mechanism of farm product allocation is. More market-oriented allocation mechanisms are consistent with this. Greater complexity through regulation, in lieu of market mechanisms that can operate within supply managed systems, create points of inflexibility and entitlement, leading to eventual stumbling blocks, inefficiencies, and costs.

Imports constrain supply managed systems, manifest primarily as processed food products rather than the related farm products. The direct impacts of imports are thus on processors and handlers, rather than on the farm segment. Volatility in imports impacts processor returns, decisions and investment, which ultimately impacts feasible production quota levels. There is thus an economic logic in allocating import permits for supply managed products to processors, with the associated economic rents. Doing so also accounts for higher/additional costs that processors experience under the regulated nature of supply management. This helps to explain the traditional approach to allocation of supply managed import permits, which has been primarily with processors.

The turbulent times motivating the development of supply management are not in the past; they represent latent threats, even if some of the threats are different today. Supply managed industries are not populated by the small, mixed farms of the 1950's and 1960's- they are professionally managed, profitable, and tend to be specialized. But it would also be naïve to suppose that past challenges could not reassert themselves. In a more uncertain time in the world, the societal benefits of a policy that facilitates a stable secure and safe supply of staple foods could seem more tangible, and valued.

The US situation provides a sense of what might otherwise be- rapid increases in milk production, worries of surplus production and accompanying low farm prices, unstable farm incomes, and ongoing dairy market volatility. Deeply established vertical integration in poultry and eggs and very few "independent" producers. Technology on farms that is broadly similar between Canada and the US- but operating at much larger scales in the US, in many cases outside of what is realistic scale in much of Canada given environmental and workplace/immigration rules. Risks of significant supply interruptions from disease associated as a result of very large scale farms in the US. The supply disruption in US infant formula only a couple of years ago, in which a single large processing plant went offline and caused a national supply crisis, illustrates the potential diseconomies of size in processing plants.

US policy responses have had some similarities with Canada- notably in dairy- with protection from imports by TRQs, and classified milk pricing and pooling covering about 70 percent of milk production under Federal Milk Marketing Orders. But in contrast to Canada, the US uses material dairy support programming for deficiency payments (such as Dairy Margin Coverage) and technical trade barriers under the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance as a form of protection. The US government is engaged in major dairy product purchases to support demand.[2] The US has not been prepared to limit the milk supply through dairy policy, instead exposing others to the excesses of its price discrimination and pooling system- as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 4.

Pressure brought to bear against products and industries under supply management in trade policy discussions could generate corresponding pressure within Canada to make concessions or somehow trade it off. The perception that supply managed systems propagate vast inefficiencies or are motivated by legacy entitlements to a narrow swath of people might be seen as justifying this. There are problems in supply managed systems, but they are neither conceptual, nor existential. The same can be said of agricultural marketing systems reliant on relatively free markets and trade.

A better understanding of the purpose of supply managed systems in Canada, designed to solve critical and persistent economic problems in agricultural marketing, should facilitate a more balanced view. The threats of legacy economic problems, now well over 50 years old, have not disappeared- they can come back. We cannot simply trade the system away, nor chip away at its institutions, without also forgoing its benefits- in terms of persistent problems resolved- and without incurring unknown costs to replace it with alternative policy measures, with unknown efficacy.

[2] See Feb 19, 2026 USDA announcement of $US 148 million in dairy purchases https://www.usda.gov/about-usda/news/press-releases/2026/02/19/secretary-rollins-announces-263-million-food-purchase-support-us-producers-and-strengthen-americas

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Agri-Food Economic Systems 5225 7th Line RR#4 Rockwood, Ontario N0B 2K0 (519) 827-6239
www.agrifoodecon.ca

Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 2(a)


Price
Marginal Cost
Supply
DWL
CS
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Demand
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Quantity

Figure 3



Figure 4



Data Annex

Table 1

	1965	1975	1995	2005	2024/25
Milk Cows, thousand head	2,795	2,132	1,245	1,041	963
Milk Production, HL	80,510,620	74,525,170	71,044,070	75,811,053	97,384,983
Laying Hens, thousand	26,068	24,076	21,693	25,637	37,074
Egg Production, thousand dozen	431,351	448,069	478,591	587,137	915,020
Poultry Production, Evis kg	322,032	403,091	862,759	1,156,293	1,576,873

Source: Statistics Canada. Poultry includes chicken, turkey, and fowl

Figure 1 Canadian Cheese and Butter Exports, Historical data



Source: Statistics Canada Series M417-427 Exports of major agricultural products, animals and animal products, quantity and value, Canada, 1868 to 1975. Archived data

Figure 2 Canadian Milk Utilization by Major Dairy Product Category, Historical



Source: Statistics Canada, Series 331-342 Utilization of total milk production, Canada

Table 2 Net Cost of Dairy Price Support Programs in Canada

Year	$ millions
1962-63	59.7
1963-64	117.2
1964-65	54
1965-66	50.3
1966-67	77.8
1967-68	99.1
1968-69	136.9
1969-70	151.6
1970-71	113.8
1971-72	119.4

Source: Veronica McCormick. 1972. "Dairy Price Support in Canada 1962–72," *Canadian Farm Economics* 7, no. 4 (1972): 2–7.

Figure 3 Annual Canadian Egg Trade, Historical



Source: Statistics Canada Series M394-402. Archived data

Figure 4 Canadian Egg Production and Value, Historical



Source: Statistics Canada Series M403-412 Eggs, production and disposition, Canada, 1920 to 1975. Archived data.

Figure 5 Canadian Poultry Trade, Historical



Source: Statistics Canada Series M377-384 Total poultry meat, supply and disposition, Canada, 1926 to 1975. Archived data

Figure 6 Canadian Poultry Production and Value, Historical



Source: Statistics Canada Series M385-393 Total poultry meat: production, disposition and farm value, Canada, 1941 to 1975. Archived data